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Building the “State” without “Peace” or Making “Peace” without the “State”: 




“Peace” and “Conflict” in Sierra Leone are integral parts of 
Politics. The elites have manipulated both and the gullible masses 
cannot see through elite deception. The truth is that Sierra Leone 
is a weak state and any peace you have in a weak state is fragile 
peace that will keep sliding in and out of conflict.1 
More than many African countries, Sierra Leone has had a portion of challenges that are 
not commensurate with its population or geographical size. Military coups, dictatorship, 
acrimonious inter-group relations and bitter civil wars have underlined the affairs of 
the former British colony with a population of just about 7 million and geographical 
perimeter of about 70,000 square kilometres. Battered and bruised from these 
experiences, the country provides a context for exploring how underlying politics and 
governance factors might impact its recovery.  In this light of particular concern is the 
necessity of the joint pursuit of peace- and state-building as essential foundational 
blocks to lasting peace. Indeed, of all the paradoxes that characterised the country, none 
seems to have been more profound as how the country has balanced the crucial subject 
of “peace-building” and “state-building” after a bitter civil war that resulted in the death 
of more than 100,000 people and brought about the displacement of more than a 
million people. Among others, key issues about how international assistance in the 
search for peace has coalesced with national realities and desires have been crucial 
barometers in assessing how the past can predict the future of the country.   
 
                                                 





Reframing national constructs after situations of intense peace and security breakdown 
that affected intergroup relations is a tedious but important national exercise. Here it is 
necessary to consider how the mutually reinforcing subjects of “peace-building” and 
state-building” come into the equation of national politics.  Crucial to these processes is 
the nature and extent to which the management of the outbreak of conflict facilitates a 
society to revisit of the central issues in its post-conflict state-building conversations. 
Addressing these issues allows for the location of peacebuilding as part of the 
continuum of state-building in which peacebuilding represents an interlude in the state-
building process that has transitioned into violence.  
 
For Sierra Leone, the peacebuilding process after its eleven years bitter civil war 
provides a rich empirical basis for the examination of fundamental issues of governance 
at the heart of its state-building conversation. As such, it allows us to locate the 
mutuality between peacebuilding and state-building. This research raises a number of 
inter-woven but mutually exclusive questions, some of which include:  
 
1. What is Sierra Leone’s historical trajectory in relation to the state-building 
conversation that took place before the civil war?  
2. What was distinct about the process leading to the post-conflict settlement? What 
are distinct features of the settlement and considerations that dictated the 
settlement?  
3. To what extent has the formal agreements reached after conflicts brought credible 
long-term peace? 
4. To what extent has peace-building returned the Sierra Leonean society to the 
original state-building “conversation” and how have fundamental issues of 
governance been addressed in the aftermath of the conflict?  
5. What identity issues that were part of the State-Building conversation were taken 
into consideration in the settlement and post settlement arrangements? 
6.  Have the gender regimes that predated conflict altered? If so, how? Does this differ 
from other identity conversations pre- and post conflict? 2 
 
                                                 
2 These are the general questions that underline all the five case-studies in this project: Kenya, Rwanda,Ethiopia, Cote 





These questions, often previously asked rhetorically, are examined in considerable 
details this paper. 
The central argument advanced in the paper is that four issues are central to the state-
building conversation in Sierra Leone. These are: the identity conversation in the quest 
for nationhood; the search for a legitimate, and effective national political culture; the 
politics (and intrigues) involved in the management of its natural resource 
endowments; and the re-engagement of societies and communities at the margins of the 
state. This study posits that efforts to address these four issues have underlined the 
state-building conversation in the country and that lasting peace will depend on the 
extent to which these issues are addressed. 
 
A discussion on the methodology employed for this study is necessary at this juncture. 
The first step was a review of the available literature on the subject. This led to the 
preparation of a baseline study that drew upon secondary sources to provide an 
overview of the key issues underlining peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in 
Sierra Leone. This process generated a key component of the research process: a set of 
propositions that were tested during field research in January 2016. Field-based study 
utilised unstructured interviews and focus group discussions across Sierra Leone The 
interviewees and FGD participants were drawn broadly and selected to satisfy the 
ethnic, gender, political and religious diversities of the country, using the snowballing 
sample method.3  
 
Broadly, the rest of this study is divided into seven sections. In the first is an attempt to 
extract relevant historical trajectories that are relevant to state-building in Sierra Leone. 
The objective here is to identify how much of history has been at the roots of the 
challenges subsequently engulfed the state. The second section identifies the key issues 
that underline state-building politics in Sierra Leone, especially those issues that were 
to become relevant to the breakdown in law and order, while section three interrogates 
the Sierra Leonean civil war and the politics of Peace settlements. In the fourth section 
is a discussion on the intricate politics of peace-building and state-building in Sierra 
Leone, focusing specifically on how the country has fared with its post-civil war 
agreements. The gender dimension of peace-building and state-building intersection in 
                                                 




Sierra Leone is discussed in the fifth section, while section six provides a discussion on 
the on-going developments relevant to peace-building and State-building in the country. 
The seventh section concludes discussion in the study by taking using past and on-going 
developments to look into the future of the West African country.  
The Inevitability of Instability: Extracting Relevant Historical Trajectories in the 
State-Building Conversations in Sierra Leone 
 
The Sierra Leonean state has always had a fundamental 
internal crack. What we witnessed with the civil war was just 
merely an expansion of the crack into an open sore. The way 
the war manifested was sufficient evidence to the fact that we 
have had contradictions that went back into the evolution of 
the state. Consequently, the question should not be why the 
state of Sierra Leone collapse but whether there was a state in 
the first instance.4  
         
As a former British colony established by freed slaves, Sierra Leone was, until the 
outbreak of its civil war in 1991, one of West Africa’s beacons of admiration.5  One of its 
tertiary institution, the Fourah Bay College, had trained many of West Africa’s early 
elites,6 and the relatively political stability, was sufficient to win it a measure of respect 
in a region with littered history of civil wars, military coups and acrimonious inter-
group relations.7 However, within this historical evolution lay many issues that were to 
play redoubtable roles in some of the developments that now characterise the political 
and economic outlooks of the country.  
 
There was a peculiarity with the way the British administered Sierra Leone between the 
late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries and this was to be at the centre of quite a 
number of problems that subsequently occurred in the West African nation. Between 
                                                 
4 Interview with Dr Max Ahmadu Sesay 
5 The country’s beaches have historically attracted visitors to the country and the general peace that existed in the 
neighbouring countries for the period immediately after independence were sources of further attraction. 
6 Fourah Bay College was the first Western style  university college in Africa and its contribution to educational 
development of the region has recently been captured in the first major book on the University, See, Anthony Karim 
Kamara, A Concise History of Fourah Bay College 1827 – 2003,   






1896 and 1951, the British divided the country into two administrative entities: the 
Crown Colony, which had been constituted in 1808, and Protectorates, which had been 
conquered by 1896. The former was mainly the domain of the Creoles, the descendants 
of the freed slaves, and the latter being territories occupied by other segments of the 
population. The Creoles were privileged with more education and access to political 
social and economic benefits of the state. Although not as profound as the situation in 
neighbouring Liberia, it was, to a large extent, similar. 
 
These sociological and geo-political divisions resulted in the privileging by the British of 
the Krios over the indigenous populations and undermined the interdependence and 
cultural understanding between the two broad groups. As a consequence, the Krios 
were highly educated and occupied most of the professional positions in the colonial 
administrations at the expense of the indigenous populations broadly described as 
illiterate.8 This subsequently reinforced the air of superiority of the Krios over the 
indigenous populations. The Krios who were more educated and Christians felt that 
they had a mission to expose the ingenious populations to “light’ and civilisation. The 
indigenous populations fiercely resisted these perceptions of cultural, religious and 
racial superiority. These racial and prejudicial distinctions however underlined and 
structured the legal, administrative, political and social relations between and within 
the colony and protectorate.9 The main underlying point of tension at the heart of this 
identity conversation was the contestation over political equality and control of the 
state.10  
 
With increased political mobilization of the Krios against colonial rule, the British 
established legal policies that increased political and public participation of the 
indigenous populations in the governance process.11 In essence, the colonizers deployed 
the ubiquitous divide and rule tactic. Additionally, the British and the natives realigned 
their economic and trade relations with the Krios following the arrival of Lebanese 
immigrants in 1907.12 This further widened the ethnic rift between the natives and the 
                                                 
8 Interview with Dr Osman Gbla, Department of Political Science Fourah Bay College 
9 Jimmy D. Kandeh 1992 Politicization of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone African Studies Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Apr. 
p.83 
10 Ibid.  
11 TRC Report: Chapter One Historical Antecedents to the conflict pp.9-10 




Krios. As independence approached, the contestations between the numerically larger 
native populations and the minority Krios centred on the control and domination of the 
post – independent political project. Remnants of these divisions continue to 
reverberate throughout the post-independence period. It, however, needs to be pointed 
out that, although the division between the Krios and other segments of the Sierra 
Leone society remained  crucial throughout the period of conflict in the country, it was 
less significant that the general ethnic differences between the North (namely Temnes) 
and the south, (largely Mendes).13 
 
The arrival of competitive politics in the 1950s also brought a string of challenges, 
especially as democracy was nascent and not embedded in the culture. The literacy rate 
at the time was also very low thus challenging the expectations of votes to be cast based 
on issues as opposed to identity. Sierra Leone has 16 or 17 ethnic groups. Against this 
background, this identity conversation shifted to reflect political contestations 
predominantly among the Mendes, Temnes and the Limbas elites over the control of the 
state and its resources. This resulted in the instrumentalization of ethnic identities by 
the elites for their narrow interests.14 As such, political organizations and divisions in 
the country were formed and historically and contemporaneously mirrored ethnic 
identities.  The post-independence ruling political party, the Sierra Leone’s People 
Party, attracted support predominantly from the Mendes and was stigmatized as a 
Mende party.15 Conversely, the All Peoples Congress led by Siaka Stevens was formed as 
a counterforce to SLPP and the Mendes and drew its support principally from the 
Temnes, and the Limbas.16 Stevens’ dictatorship for instance ensured that his 
dominance, reinforced by ethnic favouritism in the security forces, continued until the 
transfer of power to Joseph Momoh in 1985. The preference for Momoh was predicated 
on the belief by Steven that only a loyal person from his own ethnic group (the Limba) 
could protect his interests while he was outside a formal position of political power.17 
When the SLPP won office in 1996 for the first time in nearly 30 years, it was widely 
                                                 
13 We thank Ismail Rashid for drawing our attention to this point. 
14 Discussion during Focus Group Discussion 
15 Jimmy D. Kandeh (1998).Transition without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Election of 1996.African Studies 






perceived as the return to power of the Mendes.18 The dominance of northerners in the 
army remained a legacy from Stevens’ time. Hence, the military coup of May 1997 also 
reflected some shift in the ethnic complexion of power.  
 
The emergence and development of ethno-regional political identities have played a 
significant political and developmental role through class formation and domination in 
the Sierra Leone State-Building conversation.19 As will be shown later, after the conflict, 
ethnicity became more prominent in the understanding of national politics. For the 
purpose of our discussion in this project, what is crucial to note is that political elites 
have wired their interests to ethnicity and they have introduced zero-sum tendencies to 
national politics on this basis. These are crucial factors in the politics of state and peace 
building due to the degree to which they have undermined the emergence and 
development of a collective sense of national identity. From 1967 to 1990 Sierra Leone 
experienced a host of problems including, the one party rule, coup d’état, and 
clampdown on student protests, a powerful executive president, political repression, 
dictatorship, militarisation, clientele patronage relationships, and marginalization. 
Although it needs to be pointed out that issues like military coups and one-party rule 
were symptomatic of political development in many parts of Africa at the period, they 
all opened up the fragility of the Sierra Leone state.  
 
The post-independence political elites were ruthless in how they responded to dissent 
both within the opposition and within their regimes. From 1960, divisive party politics 
largely between the SLLP and APC grounded on ethnic and regional alliances and weak 
support bases fragmented the political system in Sierra Leone and with it hopes of a 
collective national identity. Political mobilization centred on the construction of a 
multiparty system and a democratic culture. The political dissent by a broad constituent 
of Sierra Leoneans immediately precipitated the replacement of Sir Milton Margai, 
following his death, by his Sir Albert Margai. The issue at this point was the 
qualifications of Sir Albert Margai. Against the background of the oppositions against 
him, Sir Albert Margai attempted to establish a one-party rule. This was widely opposed 
                                                 
18 But Kabbah tried to heal ethnic divisions by including representatives of other parties into the government 
 





and resulted in the uncovering of a coup plot against him.20 Margai’s desire to 
consolidate power further entrenched regional and ethnic polarization, cronyism in the 
public sphere and the narrowing of the political space.21 
 
Albert Margai’s loss of election in 1967 to Siaka Stevens precipitated three military 
coups within the space of one-year.22 Once he assumed office, Stevens began the process 
of arrogating more powers to himself, a process that resulted in the establishment of a 
one-party-state in 1978. A key feature and development of the Steven administration 
was the way he dealt with opposition and the consequences this was to have on the 
country’s future. While the Margai brothers were somewhat tolerant of opposition, with 
Sir Milton Margai even providing money for opposition political parties to organise 
campaigns, Steven responded ruthlessly to dissent. In May 1971, a coup attempt by John 
Bangura, who had earlier handed power to Stevens, was uncovered at conception and 
Bangura and other plotters were hanged.23 To convince Sierra Leoneans that the 
plotters had been killed, their bodies were displaced for public view. The killing of 
Bangura marked the beginning of an unfortunate sequence that was to plague Sierra 
Leone. From that moment, bloodshed became a part of Sierra Leonean politics and 
governance. Countrywide student demonstrations in 1977 against the corrupt and 
repressive APC regime marked the first attempt at political mobilization against the 
regime.24 The APC however responded ruthlessly by closing all schools and colleges, 
arresting and detaining scores of students..25 The regime dissolved parliament and 
conceded to student demands for national elections. However, after elections 
characterized by extensive violence, the Steven’s regime introduced a one-party 
                                                 
20 In response to the coup, Sir Albert Margai signed a Defence Pact with Guinea, thus providing a prelude to the 
complex regional involvement that was later to occur in the country. He ruled until 1967, when he lost election to 
Siaka Steven’s All People’s Congress (APC). 
 
21 Discussion with Dr. Max Sesay 
22 The first, led by David Lansana, a Brigadier in the army and a close friend of Albert Magai, who overthrew Stevens 
few hours after assuming office in April 1967. Another coup led by Andrew Juxton-Smith later removed Lansana in 
March 1968. This regime too was overthrown the following month by Brigadier John Bangura, who reinstated the 
constitution and brought Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister. 
23 This was in spite of the impassioned speech in which Bangura recalled his long association with Stevens and the 
assistance he gave in ensuring that Stevens became the Prime Minister. 
24 Jimmy D. Kandeh(1998).Transition without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Election of 1996.African Studies 
Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Sep.), pp. 91-111 




constitution in 1978, incorporating members of the opposition party and narrowing the 
political space even further.26  
 
In 1986, Stevens retired from politics and specifically chose Joseph Momoh, who had 
previously been the head of the Sierra Leone Army, to be his successor. There was no 
major shift in policy towards governance under Momoh. Like Stevens, he too took 
strong actions against coup plots and, in fact, had his Vice President, Francis Minah, 
hanged in 1989 for one of such alleged coups. Abuse of power continued under Momoh 
and it was not surprising that it was under him that a civil war that was to redefine the 
outlook of Sierra Leone occurred. As the 1996 elections demonstrated, the change of 
government did not lead to the transformation of institutional practices of 
government.27All these political contestations and associated repressions and 
brutalities created a reduction in the value of human life among Sierra Leoneans, a 
trend that was to be displayed to its most abysmal level during the civil war. 
 
Military coups are crucial parts in the historical evolution of the postcolonial Sierra 
Leone state. These unmasked political contestations among the political and military 
elites in Sierra Leone and had redoubtable impacts in the State-Building conversation. 
In March 1971 another military coup was organized by soldiers loyal to Bangura. One of 
those arrested and jailed for this coup was Foday Sankoh, a name that was to become 
the most infamous in the history of Sierra Leone as the head of the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF). In fact this turn of events posits the potential impact of discontent with the 
political elite by excluded groups. It also impacts on the State-Building process as 
Sankoh sought to reengage this in some way through the civil war. From here the links 
between political governance and the antecedents of violent conflict are well 
established. There was another alleged plot in July 1974, which saw eight people 
executed.  The 1997 AFRC/RUF coup, which though took place in the middle of the civil 
war, equally reflected the deepened failure of democratic renewal in Sierra Leone and 
the delinking of democracy and development.28These contestations of power among the 
various leaders had considerable impact on state-building in at least two ways. First, it 
                                                 
26 Jimmy D. Kandeh(1998).Transition without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Election of 1996.African Studies 
Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Sep.), p. 93 
27  Ibid  




created an impression that later became entrenched in the country that control of 
political power at the centre was to be aspired for with desperation and that holders of 
political power at the centre can use the control of state resources to intimidate the 
population. Second, it marked the beginning of the marginalisation of segments of the 
society, especially youths and minority ethnic groups. 
 
However, far more prominent in explaining the rots that subsequently led to the civil 
war was the nature and extent of corruption in the country.29 This was a means of 
utilising the state’s material resources to reinforce political power. The governments, 
especially the Steven’s, was notoriously corrupt and it made use extensive patronage 
that effectively undermined all the principal institutions including the parliament, 
police, armed forces and civil service. Similar to the APC, and NPRC, the SLPP under 
Tejan Kabbah remained an unregenerate patronage party which devoured that state.30 
The perceptions of a hegemonic ethnic group in the APC additionally coloured any 
vestiges of a national identity and contributed to the introduction of nepotism and 
cronyism in state institutions.31 Even at this early stage, the various contradictions that 
have underlined state-building in Sierra Leone began to define politics in the country. 
  
                                                 
29 Ibid 
30 Jimmy D. Kandeh (1998).Transition without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Election of 1996.African Studies 
Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Sep.), p. 107 





Recalcitrant Issues of Contention in State-Building Discourses in Sierra Leone 
 
Apart from ethno-regional political divide and the legacies of colonial rule, a number of 
other issues have been at the centre of state-building discourses in Sierra Leone and a 
discussion of these issues are crucial to understanding the situation in Sierra Leone 
both before and after the country’s bitter civil war. Crucial among these are four main 
issues: the politics of natural resource governance, especially the major role of 
diamonds; the role of the Lebanese in the economy and politics of Sierra Leone; 
Chieftaincy Matters and youth concerns. In this section, there is a discussion of each of 
these and how they connect to the politics of state-building and subsequently, to peace-
building discourses in Sierra Leone. 
Natural Resource Management and the Politics of State-building in Sierra Leone 
 
There is a popular anecdote among Sierra Leoneans that effectively captures the 
relationship between natural resource endowments and the politics of their 
management in the country. According to the anecdote: 
   
When at creation God blessed Sierra Leone with enormous mineral 
resources, other nations of the world complained at the favourable 
disposition of God towards the country. In response, God told them: 
“Wait till you see their leaders. 
 
By regional standards, Sierra Leone’s natural resources are significant, even if not 
exceptional. Apart from its land that is fertile for agriculture, the country also has 
considerable mineral resources, such as Gold, Diamond, Bauxite, Rutile, and Iron Ore 
and has the third largest mining deposit in the world and the largest in Africa. Of all 
these, however, diamonds are the most important, and consequently, most 
controversial. The resource was discovered in Sierra Leone in 1938, and since then, it 
has dominated the country’s economy. The deposits are located in three main fields: 
Koidu-Yengema (Kono), Tongo and Zimmi. These fields run south of Zimmi town along 
the Mano River down to the Liberian border. The deposits are shallow and require 
minimal exploitation to guarantee returns. The location as a gateway to war-torn 




after its discovery immediately contributed to the country’s national economy. But 
apart from gold and diamonds, there is iron ore at Marampa and it was a major foreign-
exchange earner until mining there was closed down in the mid-1970s.32 In terms of the 
economic benefits accruable from these resources, its relatively small population of 
about 5 million people should ordinarily have advantaged Sierra Leone. However, the 
failure to manage these resources efficiently brings the issue of natural resource 
governance into focus of attention. Indeed, as will be discussed later, it is the 
mismanagement of these resources that brought diamonds to the focus of attention in 
the country’s civil war. 
 
In looking at the Sierra Leone economy, there is the need to look at other resources 
apart from Diamond. For example, between 1970s and 1990s, it could be argued that 
iron ore (which closed down production in the mid-1970s) and rutile (shut down 
during mid-1990s civil war) have also had substantial impact on the Sierra Leone 
economy. Furthermore, while the Kimberly process and the postwar reorganization of 
the diamond industry has increased the minerals contribution to the economy, the 
restarting of iron ore production in Marampa has also been significant in the postwar 
economic calculations of the Sierra Leone political elite. The bulk of the Sierra Leone 
economy is actually agricultural production (mainly for international consumption and 
for export). The inability of the country to harness production of agricultural resources 
(which it did for most of its colonial history) and maritime resources are also an 
important part of the mix.33 
 
As with most African countries, the central government manages Sierra Leone’s mineral 
resources. In the case of Sierra Leone, the government was completely irresponsible 
and irresponsive in the way the management was done. Although structures were 
established to manage the resources these were again undermined by the government 
in what looked like self-inflicted sabotage. These further weakened the state. The first 
attempt to ensure the participation of Sierra Leoneans in the management of diamonds 
extraction in the country was the establishment in 1976 of the Alluvial Diamonds 
Mining Scheme (ADMS). Although ostensibly this was to ensure the participation of all 
                                                 
32 More recently again, bauxites have been discovered in the north. 




Sierra Leoneans in the management, the interest of the resource producing 
communities was to be at the fore of attention however, was not to be the case, as the 
introduction of the ADMS later became an opportunity for foreigners, especially 
Lebanese to become more deeply involved in the affairs of the diamonds business. As a 
way of going round the activities of the ADMS, many fictitious companies were set up by 
Sierra Leonean elites and the Lebanese. Consequently, despite the official attempt by 
the government to ensure the participation of people from the diamonds-producing 
communities, to these people, diamonds mining was an activity undertaken by 
“strangers”, either “racial” or “ethnic”.  
 
The controversies of resource control were further made more difficult by break-down 
in traditional authority and the blurring of ethnic identities of the migrant workers who 
worked in the diamonds fields. In essence the decentralization and privatization of 
extraction was expected to assist the redistribution of the proceeds among a broader 
base of Sierra Leoneans. However the success of this ‘broadening’ attempt was limited 
on account of a poor base for involvement on the part of the domestic private sector at 
the local level due to a history of exclusion on various levels, including access to basic 
social and physical infrastructure as is highlighted later in the section. Rather it 
undermined inadvertently the control and power of the state as a construct to manage 
the mineral resource sector. It also fuelled challenges to the monopoly of the state, not 
least over the use of force. Arguably it impacted on the state-building process as access 
to these resources represented stronger voices in power negotiation as evidenced by 
the main group during the civil war, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). 
 
In 1985, the government established the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), 
the primary responsibility of which was to collect revenue.34 But while in theory this 
institution existed, most of Sierra Leone’s diamond and gold were still smuggled out of 
the country. All across the country, artisan miners smuggle diamonds out of the country 
and the significant role that some of the neighbouring countries were later to play in the 
affairs of diamond mining and illegal exploitation began during this period. 
 
                                                 





Contrary to what is often assumed natural resources have been at the roots of 
controversies before the outbreak of the war in 1991. Indeed, what actually happened 
during the war was that a particular natural resource, diamonds, gained prominence in 
the politics of the conflict in the West African nation. While not underestimating the 
importance of diamonds in the war in Sierra Leone, especially its introduction of 
multiplicity of actors and brutality into the conflict, the recognition diamonds also 
attained during the war was because of other on-going wars where the resource was 
playing important roles, as in the cases of Angola and the DRC. 
 
In looking at how mineral resources underlined state-building and peace-building, four 
features of the mineral resource governance sector needs to be identified, even if not 
discussed in any significant details. The first was the role of the level of corruption and 
elite greed, which permeated all facets of the sector. It was a well-known fact that 
successive governments have illegally used resources from diamonds for personal 
enrichment. As would be discussed later, this was to be a major cause in the civil war.  
 
Second, were the activities of the “illicit” miners; it is impossible to know the exact 
number of those who were undertaking this activity before the beginning of the war but 
a figure going into several thousand will not be an exaggeration. These people who 
came from all over the world were illegally exploiting the resources at the expense of 
the local population.  Thus, the people of the diamonds producing region were victims of 
both the official government exploitation and those of the illicit miners. However, of 
these two actors, the local population felt more comfortable with the illicit miners 
because they were paid some money for the diamonds they were able to get.  
 
The third consideration was the use of the security agencies to monitor the activities in 
the diamonds producing regions. Right from the time of independence, the government 
had used the security forces to impose “order” in the diamonds regions. For example, 
the government of Sir Albert Margai used police and the army. During the period of 
President Siaka Stevens, the repression became more profound as the government, 
allegedly through the introduction of Lebanese business men like Jamil Said 
Mohammed, hired Palestinian fighters to protect diamond fields. Indeed, by the early 




bodyguards. The implication of these was that the only official government presence in 
the diamonds producing region of Sierra Leone was the security and this was mainly to 
suppress the population.  
 
Fourth and most profound of all was neglect of the diamond-producing region of the 
country. It was a well-known fact that the diamond producing parts of Sierra Leone are 
the least developed, with no electricity, pipe-borne water. Indeed, the region has 
nothing to show for producing the resource that is the life-wire of national economy.35 
This was to be a crucial reason for the bitter civil war. 
The impact of the Lebanese business community on the economy 
 
The role of the Lebanese in Sierra Leone economy has always been a source of 
considerable controversies. Indeed, it is widely known that the Lebanese have played an 
important role in the politics of diamonds production in Sierra Leone. According to the 
authoritative Partnership Africa Canada, “from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, 
aspects of Lebanon's civil war were played out in miniature in Sierra Leone, [as] various 
Lebanese militia sought financial assistance from their compatriots in Sierra Leone, and 
the country's diamonds became an important informal tax base for one faction or the 
other” Indeed, the link between Lebanese business interest and the trade in diamond 
during the war was to become a major factor in explaining the prolongation of the war. 
It has also been noted by scholars that Sierra Leone diamonds was used to finance part 
of the civil war in Lebanon. 36 Over the years, they have also developed complex 
networks of relationship with successive government functionaries at the expense of 
the state.  
 
Many of those interviewed during the field trip and those who took part on Focus Group 
Discussion also recognised that fact that the peace settlement did not accord any special 
attention to the role of Lebanese in the economy. Ironically, however, most of the 
respondents did not link this to the civil conflict or the re-occurrence of conflict. To 
them the issue of the Lebanese has been there for a long time and that it was not a 
major cause of the conflict, even though some believe that it could have been remotely 
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connected. Those who clearly connected Lebanese business community to the civil war 
equation in Sierra Leone allege that their involvement in the economy dispossesses the 
local community of their hold on the economy, thus making the society vulnerable to 
conflict. 
  
However, in looking at the activities of the Lebanese, it needs to be pointed out that the 
issue is not only that of their involvement in the diamond industry and their 
entanglement in state-supported corruption, though these are very prominent in public 
perception. The question is also one of national identity. Even though this was not 
directly tackled during the peace settlement, it now being considered tackled in the 
ongoing constitutional review. It should also be noted that the Lebanese are not unified 
group, as there are Afro-Lebanese sub-groups who were born in Sierra Leone lay claim 
to Sierra Leonean citizenship, travel with Sierra Leone passports but have been 
excluded from participating in politics.37  
Chieftaincy  
 
The other issue was that of the institution of Chieftaincy. In Sierra Leone, Chieftaincy is 
like the monarchy. But the British had balkanised these empires into tiny little 
chiefdoms. So there are now 149 chiefdoms. The British did not want people with large 
kingdoms to become too powerful. So they broke them into tiny little pieces of 
territories which they call Chiefdoms, headed by Paramount Chiefs and then sub chiefs. 
The Paramount Chief was a hereditary ruler as opposed to being a titled chief. But this 
was an extremely extortionist and abusive system. But the British had to rely on it to 
govern the rest of the country (protectorate). The chiefs were engaged in serious 
abuses: forced labour etc. At independence the SLPP had to rely on the paramount 
chiefs as their political base because the Prime Minister himself came from a chieftaincy 
family. Indeed by 1904/5 the British had established a School called the Bo School 
(Government Secondary School for Boys at Bo) for the education of the sons and 
nominee of chiefs to groom future leaders and yet this was a system of government that 
imposes heavy burden on the population. So all these structures were there at 
independence and it required a visionary and creative leader to review all these 
                                                 





institutions and find a way of developing a more cohesive system that will remove these 
anarchic systems of government.  
Youth issues 
 
This generated quite a lot of discussion. Many of the youths interviewed and those who 
took part in FGD were of the opinion that youth concerns were quite crucial to the 
outbreak of the civil war. Indeed, some of those interviewed mentioned that a popular 
British scholar described the war as a crisis of the youth. Participants in the discussion 
believe that although the Lome agreement considered the concerns of the youths, this 
was done more in the context of trying to resolve the war rather than having a long-
term plan to address the various issues concerning the youths. Some of the youths who 
took part in deliberations argued that there is a difference between looking at ways of 
placating the youths to end the civil war and looking at a long term ways of addressing 
issues surround the youths. The youth argued that those who took part in the Lome 
Peace agreement did not consider the problem in the context of their historical 
relevance. This according to them explains why the problem of youth still continues till 
date. There was visible demonstration of anger and frustration on the part of most 
youths, especially those who took part in the first FGD. Some argued that much praises 
has been given to the Lome Peace Agreement but that the agreement was more to 
placate the situation than to address long-term implications of youth concerns. When 
asked why the youths have not resorted to war despite the fact that post-civil war life 
was tough and not considered to have taken due cognisance of youth concern, there as a 
split. While most argued that this was largely because of patriotism and the desire of not 
wanting to see another round of civil war, few maintained that it was mainly because 
there was no disenchanted base to exploit again for protest and violence.  
 
Although not stressed too far, there were also subtle comments about the traditional 
assumptions that youths are not supposed to challenge adults and that the latter know 
what is in the best interest of youths. Indeed, there were those who argued that youths 
were not involved in the management of many of the discussions about the future of 
youths held during the efforts to formulate youth’s future during the war. Some of the 
youths complain that the youths that were able to make inroads into decisions during 




violence.  According to some, those who could logically discuss youth concerns were not 
involved in key decisions. In conclusion most of the youths with whom discussions were 
held during the field trip were of the opinion that the concerns of the youths were not 
considered against the background of their historical trajectories.   
 
On the other hand, interview with youth leaders from the national youth councils gave a 
somewhat positive view of the youth issues in the country.  These youth leaders noted 
that there is some kind of space for youth participation for example the district youth 
councils, the youth commission and a number of youth programmes.  The youth argued 
that before the war, local councils were not empowered. Now there are local councils in 
every ward and there are head chiefs in the parliament.  
 
However, it is important to question the extent to which these leaders have been co-
opted into elite designed and driven national youth councils. Indeed, one respondent 
argued that although a youth commission was set up to address youth issues the 
commission is not effective. It is only entrenching party power at the level of the youth. 
Additionally the ministry of youth employment is a political gimmick, which is 
ineffective as a stand-alone ministry. 
 
On the whole, in concluding this section that discusses the over-arching issues of 
contention in Sierra Leone, it needs to be pointed out that the hap-hazard management 
of them and the ways they ultimately got connected served as major factors in igniting 







Civil Wars, the Politics of Peace Agreements and the Intrigues of State-Building in 
Sierra Leone 
 
The Sierra Leone civil war (1991 – 2002) was undoubtedly the most important 
landmarks in the history of the country. It is also a topic that has attracted its own range 
of academic attention.38  The war started when the Revolutionary United Front, (RUF), a 
hitherto unknown movement took up arms against the government of President 
Momoh. The force was led by Foday Sankoh, a former army photographer who deserted 
the army after having been court-marshalled for involvement in a coup against Siaka 
Stevens. The causes of the war are diverse, but they centred around four main factors: 
(i) the mismanagement of the country’s natural resources; (ii) the absence of credible 
democracy; (iii) the total neglect of the rural community; and (iv) the contagious effects 
of the war in neighbouring Liberia.  
 
Three characteristics of the war are worthy of note because of their contributions in 
shaping the future of Sierra Leone. These are: the extent of the brutality; the diversity of 
the actors that participated; the role of diamonds; and the nature of the final cessation 
of the conflict. The brutality that manifested in the war was severe and at a stage, the 
RUF became one of the world’s most brutal insurgent forces, using youths to perpetrate 
most of its atrocities. On the whole, about 50,000 people died and up to half a million 
people displaced. Again, in what became its most gruesome signature, the war produced 
up to 4,000 amputees – including babies as young as three months. It was this brutality 
that brought the war to the focus of international attention. 
 
On its part, the diversity of actors was a factor that made the war potentially confusing, 
with ephemeral alliances changing the tides of battle fortunes. It also made the peace 
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process more complicated. At the beginning, it was between the rebel force and the 
government forces, then loyal to the late President Joseph Momoh. In April 1992, a coup 
sent Momoh into exile and established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). 
The NPRC proved equally ineffective in dealing with the RUF and by 1995 the RUF 
controlled most of the countryside and had arrived at the outskirts of Freetown. In the 
attempt to address the situation, the NPRC hired several hundred mercenaries from the 
firm Executive Outcomes. A civil militia group, known as the Kamajors also emerged 
after the coup. To all these various actors were to be added the (Sobel) a sobriquet for 
those who operate both as rebel and soldier. 
 
The third aspect of the war with long-term implication was the link with diamonds. 
Indeed the war attained notoriety because of the desperate desire of all the warring 
sides to have access to diamonds. This was also to explain the multiplicity of external 
actors that came into the politics of the civil war. The important role of diamonds in 
explaining the external ramifications of the conflict is evident in the subsequent 
conviction of former President Charles Taylor of involvement in the Sierra Leone civil 
war. This now leads to a discussion of the peace process. 
Distinct Features of the Pre-Settlement and Settlement Process   
 
The efforts to end the war in Sierra Leone began almost as soon as it started. However, 
the various truncations it experienced meant that the impacts were often not noticeable. 
As in all cases, the initial effort was to end the war and create a crude semblance of 
order around which post-conflict reconstructions can commence. The peace process in 
Sierra Leone was characterised by a number of events with their associated distinctive 
features, which had an impact in the prolongation of the conflict, and defined the 
complexity Peace-Building process and the degree to which it laid basis for lasting 
peace. 
The multiplicity, and shifting alliances of the main protagonists 
 
The process of bringing peace to Sierra Leone was quite complex for at least two 
reasons. First, there were some actors whose position was not formally recognised for a 
very long time, even though they were widely recognised as being dominant actors in 




then as a warlord, could not have been formally invited to come into the negotiation 
table in some of the early discussions. Consequently, his non-involvement in the process 
meant that he was not even legally liable to any violation accusation. This was to be a 
major factor in the prolongation of the conflict. 
 
Second, the patterns of alliances were constantly shifting and the main actors were 
multiplying accordingly. There were militia groups, mercenaries, rebels, and 
government soldiers all shifting and re-juggling alliances; at a stage the rebels and the 
soldiers fought alongside each other against the regional force. In circumstances of this 
nature, the extent to which enduring Peace-Building could be quickly implemented is 
severely limited.  
The main Peace-Building actors and their varying motivations and interests and 
cross purposes 
 
To a very large extent, those who intervened to bring peace and restore the statehood of 
Sierra Leone were dictated by circumstances. With actors already involved in 
neighbouring Liberia, those who went into Sierra Leone were those somewhat 
“seconded” from Liberia and these were the regional organisation, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations. While the 
intentions of both were the same, the extent of motivation differed. For ECOWAS, the 
location of the country ruled out indifference as an option to the organisation, while the 
United Nations felt that another state collapse after Liberia would destabilise the entire 
Sub-region. Second, the regional organisation that was determined to bring peace to the 
country, ECOWAS, was again not operating as a united front. Indeed, one of the 
countries, Cote d’Ivoire was known to be a sympathiser of the rebel force in the country. 
Other lesser interveners that intervened, albeit on a lesser scale, were UK, the African 
Union and hired mercenaries.  Notwithstanding the prominence of these actors, Sierra 
Leone was not without an organized civil society, which had clarity about the causes of 
the war and a preferred path to stable peace. 
“Flawed” Peace Agreements: Abidjan, Conakry, and Lome Agreements  
Three main agreements were signed to end the Sierra Leone Civil War. The first was the 




RUF in November 1996 and terminated following the May 1997 coup. The second was 
the Conakry Agreement, signed in October 1997, between the military Junta (AFRC) of 
Johnny Paul Koroma and ECOWAS. This agreement was terminated when ECOMOG 
removed the AFRC Junta from power before the due date stipulated in the agreement. 
This was later followed by the Lome Peace Agreement, signed in July 1999 between 
President Kabbah and the RUF and remained among the most controversial agreements 
ever signed in the sub-region.39  
A common feature that underlined the design of these three agreements was the extent 
to which the agreements sought to appease the main protagonists and therefore end the 
conflict at the expense of addressing the structural causes of the conflict that lay at the 
State-Building conversation. Tied to this was the erroneous assumption regarding the 
willingness and commitment of the RUF and the capacity of the government of 
President of Kabbah to building lasting peace.40   
The Abidjan Agreement granted a general amnesty to RUF in return for the rebels 
ending their activities.41 The main aim of the Conakry Agreement was to allow for the 
return of the overthrown government of President Kabbah within six months.42 This 
baseline study however focuses on the Lome Agreement was as it was central to the 
peace process for it provided for the entry of the largely externally driven Peace-
Building process. 
The Lome Agreement was emblematic of a number of omissions and concessions that 
undermined the sustainability of the peace process. The Lome Agreement granted 
significant and controversial concessions. The agreement legitimized the RUF, and 
basically indemnified its brutal actions by granting the rebel group public offices.43 
Article V especially dismayed Sierra Leoneans, for it specifically allocated cabinet 
                                                 
39 President Kabbah did not want to sign any further agreement with the RUF, but domestic and external pressure 
forced him to capitulate. Domestically, the rebels controlled the controlled the main diamond mines, which meant 
that some form of agreement had to be reached. External pressures came from Britain and Nigeria. Britain needed a 
face-saving agreement after the controversial Sandline Affairs. Sandline Affair, which saw the British Labour 
government, accused of contravening a UN arms embargo by allowing a private military company to supply arms to 
the Sierra Leone government and ECOMOG forces. Nigeria on the other hand was finding the human and financial 
cost of regional peacekeeping difficult to sustain. 
40 Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero Op-cit p.120 
41 See Abidjan agreement  
42 See Conakry agreement 





appointments to members of the rebel force44 Articles III to IV also allowed for power 
sharing with the government through the transformation of RUF into a political party 
and the formation of a broad based government of national unity. This provisions belied 
RUF commitment to peace. 
Furthermore, the agreement ensured the disarming of the RUF by controversially 
pardoning Foday Sankoh for treason and granting him the position of chairman of the 
commission (with equivalent rank of a vice president) that oversaw Sierra Leone’s 
diamond mines and therefore unreserved control of Sierra Leone’s strategic natural 
resources.45 The agreement made Sankoh answerable only to the President of Sierra 
Leone. The Lome Agreement as such is also distinct and infamous in the extent to which 
it individualized the peace agreement around the person of Foday Sankoh. This and the 
lack of a credible sanction regime to deal with non-compliance with the agreements 
gave Foday Sankoh and the rebel group room to manoeuvre and therefore opportunity 
to delay the peace process.46  
Additionally, the agreement excluded key actors in the conflict including local militias, 
Karamajors, and remnants of SLA from the negotiation and implementation of the 
agreement.47Article XI of the agreement also controversially granted RUF 'absolute and 
free pardon ... in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to 
the time of the signing of the Lome agreement48 and as a result denied justice to the 
victims of RUF atrocities.49 This blanket amnesty resulted in internal and external 
backlash against the UN and other external parties to the negotiation. The accord 
however provided for the establishment of a TRC, while reneging of the agreement by 
RUF following the events of May 2000 forced the UN to rethink the amnesty offer 
therefore allowing for the set up a special court.50  
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The contradictions and defects within the Lomé agreement allowed for the compromise 
of the position of Sierra Leone and demonstrated the limits and dangers of externally 
imposed peace at the expense of building a sustaining peace process. 
Uncoordinated International Response  
 
The first set of international response to the war in Sierra Leone came from the West 
African sub-region through the ECOMOG peacekeeping mission. Although this was a 
major intervention which was carried out with enormous determination, it later 
required the assistance of the international community. This international response to 
the conflict in Sierra Leone represents a model of disengagement. The international 
community’s indifference to the unfolding crisis in Sierra Leone was due to the fact that 
Sierra Leone represented minimal economic and strategic importance to the West.51 
Indeed, the initial experience of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) instructively demonstrates the inadequate and uncoordinated international 
response to the civil war. UNAMSIL would however later become a model UN Mission.52 
 
The operationalization of the Lome Agreement allowed for the departure of ECOMOG 
and the entry of a United Nations Team to supervise the ceasefire, disarmament and 
demobilisation plans. However, faced with low troop numbers, a weakened mandate 
and conflicting contingents, UNAMSIL’s 500 peacekeepers in May 2000 would find 
themselves hostage to the obstinate RUF rebels. This eventually led to the collapse of 
the Lome agreement.  The May 2000 events demonstrated improper assessment of the 
situation in Sierra Leone and the lack of contingency planning on the part of the UN 
peacekeeping force, the overreliance and erroneous assumption that the peace 
agreement would work and the single-minded focus on the demobilisation and 
disarmament tasks.53 Additionally, the uncoordinated and inadequate deployment of 
6000 troops to UNAMSIL reflected the unwillingness of the UN member states to offer 
sufficient personnel, logistical and technical support to UNAMSIL.54 This apathy sums 
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up the UN’s reluctance and inaction to respond decisively throughout the civil war until 
the events of May 2000.  
 
To further compound UNAMSIL’s problems, the UK intervention aimed at evacuation of 
British and European nationals was merely a show-off of UK military might rather than 
a genuine attempt to reinforce UNAMSIL.55 These “over-the-horizon” displays and 
British unwillingness to commit troops under UN auspices heavily dented UN’s already 
tarnished image, challenged the mission’s raison d’etre and explicitly demonstrated the 
lack of faith in the UN. 
 
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat argues that 'Sierra Leone showed that the political and 
operational lessons from failed UN missions in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia had not 
been learned”.56 UNAMSIL’s initial experience highlighted the mismatch between 
mission mandates and the lack of resources and support from UN member states of the 
UNSC that continued to plaque UN peacekeeping operations. As the Brahimi report 
articulated UNAMSIL represents the problems of international peacekeeping including 
lack of greater cohesion and direction, better rules of engagement, resources, well-
structured command and control, adequate equipment and political will and support 
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How Easy Thereafter: The Juggling of Peace-Building and State-Building in Post 
Civil War Sierra Leone 
 
A key feature of the external post-conflict Peace-Building programme in Sierra Leone 
was the promotion of transitional justice through national reconciliation and healing 
and the prosecution of those responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Leonean law committed since November 30 1996. These two 
agendas were enshrined in the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) and the Special Court respectively and are by products of the Lome Agreement.58 
 
Notwithstanding the funding and operational challenges that marred the two 
processes59, there were questions regarding the extent to which both institutions 
achieved their main objectives and therefore set Sierra Leone back to its State-Building 
conversations. A major criticism relates to the tensions regarding the overlapping 
mandates of the two institutions. In particular, the work of the Special Court was 
undermined by the reluctance by perpetrators to the conflict to appear before the TRC 
for fear that their testimonies would be used against them in the Special court.60 Second, 
the confidence of the special court among Sierra Leoneans was undermined by the 
failure of the court to try perpetrators who bore the greatest responsibility for the war. 
With the exception of the trial of Charles Taylor, Issa Sesay and others, the deaths of key 
perpetrators of the war without trial including Foday Sankoh, Sam Hinga Norman, Sam 
Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma undermined the mission of the Special Court. Third, 
by seeking to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility the court failed to 
prosecute the actual perpetrators of the atrocities who carried out the orders of their 
commanders. On the contrarily, the foot soldiers were integrated in the national armed 
forces. The Final Report of the TRC also highlighted the lack of focus on the plight of the 
victims noting that meaningful truth telling cannot occur without adequate reparations 
for victims of conflict.61 
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Furthermore, the mandated timelines for the two institutions further raise questions 
regarding the extent to which the two processes revisited the historical State-Building 
conversation that lay at the roots of the conflict. The Special court was only mandated to 
deal with atrocities committed after 30 November 1996.  This however fails to capture 
most of the atrocities that were committed before this date. Additionally, section 6 of 
the TRC Act of 2000 tasked the commission with the objective of creating a historical 
record of the violations of human rights from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 until 
the signing of the Lome Peace agreement.62 These timelines again cut off the historical 
period in the Sierra Leone State-Building conversation. Furthermore, legislation for the 
establishment of the TRC provided for a 12-month operational phase. These limited-
time mandates pale in comparison to the historical period in the State-Building 
conversation and therefore puts in doubt the meaningfulness and efficacy of the 
national reconciliation and rebuilding process.  
 
Broadly, a number of issues are worth interrogating about the connection of state-
building and peace-building in Sierra Leone. These are: the level of effectiveness of the 
international institutional capacity building approach; the nature of inter-group 
relations since the end of the civil war; the management of natural resources since the 
signing of the Lome Peace Agreement that ended the war; and how the country fared on 
the crucial issue of corruption.  These issues have been selected because they are the 
main issues that accounted for the war and also were the fundamental issues that the 
peace agreement attempted to address to prevent recourse to war. Since Sierra Leone 
has not returned to conflict since the signing of the agreement in 2002 (thus breaking a 
decade possibility of relapse rule) there is the need to investigate whether the 
agreement was effectively well packaged to address all aspects of the war or whether 
there were other factors that prevented a relapse.  
 International institutional capacity building approach. 
 
The post conflict international state-building process in Sierra Leone thus followed the 
tried and tested post conflict institutional reconstruction model. This approach largely 
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focused on rebuilding of state institutional capacity including the reconstruction of 
courts, prison and police buildings. This institutional State-Building approach in Sierra 
Leone with it emphasis on institutional efficiency and technocratic support, 
microeconomic stability and consolidation of state authority is articulated in the Interim 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) of June 2001 and Sierra Leone National 
Recovery Strategy of 2002.63 However as Christof Kurz argues, donor driven analytical 
and policy prescriptions influenced by neoclassical economics ideas with their focus on 
individual decision-making and functionalist formal institutions ignore the historical 
and sociological process in the Sierra Leone state formation process and elsewhere.64 
Though his diagnosis of the flawed assumptions inherent in international peace and 
State-Building processes are correct his alternative analytical framework of 
understanding the state formation process in Sierra through clientelism also fails to 
capture adequately the State-Building conversation in Sierra Leone. 
 
This international institutional peace building approach has encountered many 
challenges. Significant to this is the extent to which these international institutional 
building has contributed to the governance process and therefore mediated the post 
conflict State-Building conversation in Sierra by addressing the governance issues 
between the elites and the people. All participants mentioned that there has been the 
setting up various institutions such as the anticorruption commission, ombudsman, and 
human rights commission, and the passing of various laws including the three gender 
laws. There is a level of satisfaction within the society with the enactment of these laws 
and the setting up of these institutions that did not previously exist before the war. 
However, the biggest challenge is guarantying that these institutions are effectively 
running, are free of state or political inference and thus able to address the above 
recurring issues that were and are at the statebuilding conversation in Sierra Leone. 
Despite the enactment of these laws and the building of institutions, the main challenge 
lies with the judiciary, there are challenges with the interpretation of law, the lack of 
evidence, delays in sittings that can take up to two or three years. 
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Most participants highlighted the judiciary in particular as undergoing significant 
challenges and thus setting the state back to its fragility. This includes a general lack of 
rule of law and state control of the judiciary. Most participants noted that despite the 14 
million DFID funding for the Justice and Security Sector reforms a lot of the issues that 
affected the judiciary in the pre-war and war period have shown a return.  For example 
the judiciary lacks independence, and the police remain undemocratic, rise in 
corruption within the judiciary and the lack of free and fair trials. One participant from 
the civil society argued that these issues have shown a reversal because the body 
politics has not changed. He attributed this to the fact that donors do not want to touch 
politics in Sierra Leone. As such, there has not been a sober conversation in Sierra Leone 
on politics. The structures created after the Peace-Building process are there although 
there are challenges with the working of these structures. Even though they are not 
working effectively, there is some level of confidence with these structures since they 
did not exist before the war. There is some level of confidence that there is some form of 
mechanism for redress.  
 
One participant from the civil society argues that there has not been a building of 
capable political parties and the effective oversight institutions like the parliament. He 
further argues that a lot of money has been spent on the executive and oversight 
institutions have been left out. He further argues that the government budget has 
focused on buying water-guns for the police demonstrating that Peace-Building is yet to 
change the logic of the state. This lack of effective and inclusive institutions is a threat to 
democracy. 
Continuation of divisive party politics along ethnic lines. 
 
The electoral contestation during the November 2012 elections largely between Enerst 
Koroma of the APC and Maada Bio of the SLPP re-invoked old rivalry between the two 
political parties and has further underlined the role of ethnicity in national politics with 
the Mende supporting the SLPP and Temne supporting Koroma. Ethnic and sectional 
fault lines have also galvanized post=election tension and violence. The fiercely 
contested 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections that brought the opposition 




have the potential to ignite violence upon the slightest provocation and plunge the 
country once more into chaos. The same could be said of the July 2008 Local 
government elections. In 2011, political violence first erupted on the national level in 
July when APC supporters allegedly attacked the SLPP nominee and flag bearer, 
Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. In the ensuing violence, one person was reported killed and 
20 people suffered injuries. Several buildings were also burnt down, including the local 
APC party office. The incumbent President Koroma won the election and the impact of 
ethnicity on politics has continued ever since.  
 
After the conflict, there was a failure to deal with the winner takes all approach to 
politics during the peace process. Most participants noted that people are very tied to 
their political parties. This issue is undermining the performance of the government. 
With some respondents arguing that few in the government are working for the nation 
but instead for their political parties. The issues that led to the civil war in the first place 
such as patrimonialism, lack of rule of law, political interference in state institutions, 
corruptions and youth unemployment continue to be recurring issues in the post 
conflict state building conversation in Sierra Leone. One participant from the civil 
society noted that these issues do not appear within the political strategies of political 
parties. He further argues that there was no party strengthening after the conflict to 
oblige political parties and especially SLPP and APC to peace.  Some respondents argued 
that the former president Kabbah ran an inclusive government. However, APC changed 
everything for the worse. The style of governance that characterised the pre-war period 
is the same with a weak opposition to offer alternative leadership 
 
Divisive party politics between the SLPP and APC continue to undermine the 
development of a collective national identity. These divisions have largely shaped 
regional divisions in the country. These party divisions moreover have shaped regional 
development.  Most respondents noted that there has been a lot of development in the 
North and the South remains largely neglected. The current ruling party therefore has 
been accused of development its regional strongholds.  While a majority of the 
respondents, argued that regional differences instead of ethnicity current form part of 
the identity conversation in Sierra Leone is it intricate to disentangle ethnicity from 




geographical locations to which the different and competing ethnic groups reside. This 
intricate relationship between the region and ethnicity is also representative of and is 
shaped by the historical and contemporaneous party divisions between the SLLP and 
APC are which are grounded on ethnic divisions.  
The management of intergroup relations in post conflict statebuilding conversation 
 
There is a huge question about the extent to which the post settlement agreements 
addressed identity issues in Sierra Leone. While ethnicity was not a cause of the conflict, 
political elites have continued to manipulate ethnicity and regional differences. Regional 
differences in particular have acquired a more pronounced saliency in comparison to 
ethnicity in the post conflict State-Building conversation.  While most respondents 
argued that ethnicity is not are major issues in Sierra Leone, ethnicity is also deeply and 
intricately intertwined with regional divisions. Although they do not highlight ethnicity 
as a major issue they are aware of how politicians manipulate ethnicity to wire and 
achieve their own self-interest. Although Diversity issues were half way addressed by 
the post settlement agendas, there is an appetite for cohesion in Sierra Leone. Most 
participants noted that there are numerous inter marriages along ethnic, racial and 
regional lines. These inter marriages are also present at the top political level for 
example at the cabinet level with both the current and previous presidents marrying 
from different regions other than their own. 
 
However, there was no agreement about the saliency of ethnicity in post conflict Sierra 
Leone with some participants arguing that ethnicity is not a major issue while others 
argued that it is very profound. The participant from the civil society noted that there is 
no real tribalism in Sierra Leone.  However, politicians want people to think more of 
tribe than of service. The management of ethnic relations is therefore a matter of 
political strategy. However, two participants (youth and civil society) noted that 
politicians have realised that no single ethnic group can clinch the 51% majority 
required to win the elections and therefore they have to mobilise the other ethnic 
groups. The two participants also noted that major political divisions are between the 
Temne and Mende with the youth arguing that these two ethnic communities are the 
major problems.  The participant from the women market association noted that 




occurring at the governance level or elite level but the ministry of internal affairs is 
trying to neutralise it. However, it is still playing out because of fear and suspicion. The 
head of the Women’s market association argued that people are tied to their political 
party and by implication to their ethnicity.  This is undermining the performance of the 
government, as there are few government officials who are working for the nation and 
not for the party.  The youth also noted that ethnic divisions express themselves along 
party lines. The journalist noted that Sierra Leone is going back to the pre-war divisive 
ethnic politics. The head of the women’s market association argued that ethnicity is very 
personal.   The talk of ethnicity in Sierra Leone is part of propaganda and disruptive 
elements. People will always easily gravitate to their ethnic affiliations. Politics is 
therefore local and people will always hold on to their values and cultural backgrounds 
for affiliations. There was a failure to deal with the winner takes all approach to politics. 
The Journalist believes that Sierra Leone is going back to the pre-war divisive ethnic 
politics. He argues that ethnicity is profound and there are no ideological positions 
within the body politics. Elections are about money and power.  
 
Regional divisions therefore characterise the identity conversation in post conflict 
Sierra Leone. Most respondents noted the discrimination in the allocation of resources 
along regional divides.  However, the participant from the opposition party argued that 
the regional divide is increasing although a lot of effort is being made to integrate the 
north, southeast and west. A member of MP argued that during the post construction 
period the government has paid more attention to the North than to the south. In a very 
short period, there are cleaner streets, more hotels, more mining companies, more 
agricultural input in the north, the south suffers from marginalisation. .Moreover,   some 
participants noted that the development of infrastructure is driven by which party is in 
power. For example the APC government has constructed a 31 KM urban road in Makeni 
in the North of the country, which is its strong hold. Moreover, the journalist argued 
that the north has more political positions that the south and the MP argued that the 
constitution of Koroma’s government is increasingly made up of people from his region. 
The MP argued that the regional divide is more pronounced than tribalism. However, 





All participants agreed that religion is not an issue in Sierra Leone. The formula that 
stipulates that if the president is Muslim the vice president has to be Christian has 
enhanced integration and harmony between Christians and Muslims. This formula is 
also present within parties. However, faith is not a factor in the appointment of political 
positions. 
Natural Resource Governance 
 
Since the end of the war, efforts to manage natural resources have been relatively 
impressive, both because the country needed the money coming from these resources 
and also because of the realisation that any mismanagement could return back to a 
bitter conflict. In an attempt to appease the diamonds producing region of the country 
and also address international condemnation that was coming to the country because 
of its treatment of the diamond regions, the government later came up with a scheme 
whereby a percentage of the resources coming from diamonds is used to develop the 
local community. This initiative was, however, believed to have come too late and it 
was also considered as being too little. Diamonds have also played an important 
role in Sierra Leone's post war recovery. The coming into place of the Kimberley 
Process, the international regulatory mechanism that was established to monitor 
international trading in illegal diamonds, also assisted in ensuring that diamonds in 
Sierra Leone was quick to make a reverse from the negative image it had 
established during the period of the war. 
 
With the increase in diamond production and the end of the war, it then became 
possible for the government to divert more resources to post-war recovery. 
However, although increase in diamond revenue has assisted the government, it is 
also important to point out that the extent of destruction was too much for what 
this can address and as such the bulk of the money used for post-war 
reconstruction have been through donor funding. One aspect of post-war recovery's 
link with diamonds is the gradual increase that seems to be emerging in the social 
responsibility of some of the foreign diamond businessmen in the country. In 
some of the diamond producing regions of the country, Lebanese businessmen 




including the provision of security. Although this has not gone round all the regions, 
it is an initiative that seems to be attracting the interests of the local community. 
 
Sierra Leone natural resources base is also growing with exploration of mining, 
marine and oil resources. Like many other natural resources, the government is also 
making plans to come up with a major policy position on the management of marine 
resources. There are however concerns with the illegal exploitation of these marines 
resources by foreign vessels and their management.65 Sierra Leone's economy is now 
about to be turned around significantly with the discovery of oil.66 In 2009, the 
President established a Task Force to develop a new Petroleum Policy. The draft 
policy reflects concerns regarding good governance and prudent ec onomic 
management of oil revenues for current and future generations. There can, however, be 
no doubt that the success will depend on the commitment and capacity to translate 
policy into action. The government is also trying to set up a National Oil Company. 
Also since the announcement of the find, a number of donors and NGOs have been 
involved in Petroleum governance and policy reform. One of the most prominent 
concerns of stakeholders is that oil might make Sierra Leone to fall victim of what 
has been described as "The oil-tragedy".  
Corruption and Management 
 
Corruption has reduced considerably, even though it is still a major issue in Sierra 
Leone. The presidency of the late Tejan Kabbah was marred with allegations of 
corruption against top government officials, although none was proven and nobody was 
convicted. The current President Koroma also has allegations of corruption on his neck. 
Although the President is widely considered to be above board on the issue of 
corruption (he was, in fact the first President to declare his assets) he is surrounded by 
                                                 
65 Presently there are over 100 licensed vessels and more than half that number poaching. This is as a result of 
the fact that Sierra Leone had constantly been unable to supply the resources/logistics to protect its 
marine resources from unlicensed fishing, resulting in an over exploitation, lack of benefits to the country 
and an overall damaging effect to the resources eco-system. This has seen a number of attacks on local 
fishermen and the destruction of their fishing equipment. In some instances, the attacks have led to deaths and 
capture of citizens from neighbouring countries especially Guinea. There are, however, growing concerns now 
about the management of marine resources and in August 2012, there was a major protest by irate fishing 
mongers about the government's policies which they claimed was preventing them from having access to 
quality fish. 
66.In September 2009, the United States independent oil firm, Anadarko, announced the discovery of a 
hydrocarbon system off the Sierra Leonean coast. The company operates the Venus B-1 exploration well in its 





people believed by people believed to be more controversial on issue of corruption. 
Some of the corruption issues have been to the top of government and President 
Koroma’s Vice President, Samuel Sumana, faced a major allegation of corruption over 
logging in Sierra Leone levelled by the Al Jazaara News.  
 
Gender Dimensions of Peace-Building and State-Building 
 
2015 is perhaps a strategic moment to assess how far Sierra Leone has gone with the 
placing of gender in the State-building and Peace-building equation, as the year marks 
exactly 20 years since the Bintumani 1 Conference, where Sierra Leone women came 
out forcefully to demand that the military regime hold election that eventually led to the 
resolution of the civil war. But in looking at how much things have changed, there is the 
need to first provide a brief summary of what existed before and during the war. Like 
most West African countries, gender considerations in Sierra Leone before the civil war 
was something everybody considered important but which nobody took seriously. The 
deep-seated patriarchal nature of the society was strong enough to stifle any strong 
attempt to advance the interest of the country’s female population. Although women 
played an important role in the country’s struggle for independence,67 this soon paled 
into insignificance shortly after independence. What further eroded the significance of 
women in national politics were the plethora coups, counter coups, one party rule that 
bedevilled the country. In short, by the time the civil war in the country began, the era of 
women in political activism had literarily come to an end in Sierra Leone. Among others, 
issues such as female genital mutilation, early marriage, low employment and poor 
education were the order of the day.  
The civil war had a most devastating effect on the female population in Sierra Leone and 
this has been the focus of attention in several detailed studies.68  Where they had not 
been forced into become combatants, they had been raped and brutalised, not to talk of 
thousands who were killed. Several thousand too were forced into refugee camps 
outside the country while possibly up to a million internally displaced. Moreover, all the 
various forms of violence against women point to the violent masculinities inherent in 
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the society and made worse by the conflict through for example rape of women. It is 
thus against this background that women played a significant role in the politics of 
peace settlement.69 
 
Possibly against the background of the role they played in the peace efforts high profile 
campaigns to increase women’s representation in Sierra Leone’s public life started 
during the peace settlement. Indeed, the gender dynamics that existed before the 
outbreak of conflicts began to change, if somewhat slowly. Although there is still a 
gender disparity in the holding of political positions, the gender conditions that 
excluded women from full participation in society before the war are beginning to shift. 
A member of the parliament interviewed during the field trip noted that UNSCR 1325 
has helped a lot to change the gender dynamics. It has been used as a campaign tool to 
say that women should be involved. After the conflict, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
advocated for the first past the post system. This proportional representation system 
helped women achieve key positions in the parliament. Additionally, the CSOs 
advocated for the zipper system within political parties that has helped to increase the 
number of women candidates in parties.  This increased the number of women in 
parliament to 16. However, the constituency replaced this proportional representation 
system based electoral system.  Although the TRC provided for 30% quotas for women 
participation, this has not materialised, and increasingly the country is sliding back to 
the level of women participation in politics to the pre-war conditions. With the 
constituency electoral system, it is difficult for women to gain political positions 
although there are now 14 MPS and 1 cabinet minister.  
 
The declining in women participation in politics is equally supported by statistics. For 
example, during the 2007 Elections the rate of women participation was 17%. This 
figure has continued to decline since. Out of 124 members of parliament and 12 
paramount chiefs there are only 14 women parliamentarians.  
 
It was noted by people met during the field trip that with the coming of the constituency 
electoral system it is now difficult for women to be involved.  Women candidates are 
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known and accepted by the political parties.  Campaigns have also become more violent 
thus limiting for women. The cultural limitation that prevents women in most parts of 
Sierra Leone to be Paramount Chiefs has also limited participation in politics, while 
sexual harassment has also reduced women participation by marginalising and 
silencing them for fear of reprisal.  
 
There is increasing sexual harassment within government ministries at all levels. This 
low participation by women translates to low interest in women issues.  Successive 
post-war administrations have not put in place structures for women security, 
development and participation. While pillar 8 of the current government’s Agenda for 
Prosperity focused on women there is nothing tangible. Additional the APC Agenda for 
Change does not focus on women at all. While superficially there are flashes indicating 
women participation at the grassroots level, they are not at the forefront of politics. 
Political parties also do not appoint women to strategic positions. Some efforts are 
being made to bring women into local governance structures. However, it is still very 
difficult for women to attain top positions within these structures. Ironically, the extent 
of the patriarchal nature of the society even mean that women are more likely to 
support their husbands’ political parties than their women folk. 
 
Parliament has passed a number of laws that provide for the legal protection of women. 
Before the war and after the war, the parent of the wife had to pay everything for 
divorce. This made divorce very difficult for women. However, parliament passed the 
registration of customary marriages and divorce that legalized divorce.  Additional the 
sexual offence act that includes the definition of marital rape provides for legal redress. 
The devolution of estate act gives women the right to estate. Previously, customarily 
women were not allowed to inherit land.  Third, the domestic violence act protects 
women against domestic violence and obliges the police to treat domestic violence as 
abuse. An academic argued that parliament passed the sexual violence act because it is 
less political. People at the top are manipulation a lot of issues. For example although 
the rate of FGM is very high any party coming to government will not touch on this as 
the opposition will argue that the government is trying to erode their culture. In 
addition while Sierra Leone is a signatory to the Maputo protocol, politicians still 





Sierra Leone has also ratified the clauses on the Maputo protocol that discourages 
harmful traditional practices.  Women reproductive and sexual rights were ratified. 
However, the president due to pressure from the religious council did not sign safe 
abortion approved by parliament. The 1861 offences against persons act criminalize 
abortion and anybody considered any accomplices to abortion. The act also allows the 
women to die.  However the proposed act allows for abortion under supervised 
conditions and decriminalizes any support offered by doctors and others. It allows the 
doctors to save the woman. Free health care has also helped a lot of women 
 
Parliament has also looked at obsolete laws and passed a number of laws that relate to 
child marriages, and child recruitment, and passed the three gender laws, and 
criminalized rape. There are a number of instruments that have been set up to address 
the practice that allowed men to kick women out of the house following cohabitation no 
matter the number of years. Such acts include he domestic violence act, the devolution 
of estate act and the sexual offences acct. The high literacy rates remain a challenge to 
changing some of the customs and traditions that interfere with the constitution.  For 
example, the customs do not allow women to take part in decision-making processes. 
The large illiteracy rates in the county means that you have to set up a five year plan to 
educate and create awareness within the society.  
 
All participants noted that parliament has passed a number of laws that have advocated 
for gender equality such laws include the sexual acts law and the gender laws.  The civil 
society participant noted that there has been some change in the gender dynamics at 
the community level but this change has not materialised at the state level, which 
remains largely patriarchal. The family support unit that provides for reporting, 
medication and lawyers for victims of harassment lacks a budget for its running.  Before 
the war, women had no rights legally.  Most participants noted that controversial 
section 27 of the current constitution, which bans discrimination but argues that culture 
and traditions prevail before the law. This proviso is controversial for it allows women 
to be discriminated on cultural grounds.  There are however efforts to expunge this 





Girl child education remains a challenge. Before the war there was no education for 
women and boy child education was favoured. Girl child marriages were very common 
and there was no protection for women.  These gender dynamics became very clear 
during the war.   The post war development package encouraged awareness for girl 
child education. This was supported by the government and in turn increased women 
skills. Also, there has been an increase in school enrolment for the girl child as a result 
of the increasing awareness of the importance of education.  There is a lot that is needed 
to promote women participation in science and technology and in higher education. 
 
Despite some form of progress that has been made, there are still profound and 
disturbing situations of gender violence that do not come to national attention. A recent 
one that caught national attention was the case of 17 years Hannah Bockarie who was 
brutally assaulted and murdered and her body left on Lumley Beach.70 This led to huge 
outcry from women-groups in the country and brought to the fore the support available 
for victims of gender violence in the country. This study was able to found out that 
although there is the Family Support Unit in Sierra Leone that is charged with 
investigating reported cases of rape, the Head of the Unit, Superintendent Mira Koroma, 
concedes that the Police remain unequipped to undertake the task and that they have 
been relying on old methods to deal with sexual violence. The budget of the Unit is just 
Le 2,000,000 per quarter, a situation that has been forcing the unit to rely on donor 
funding.71 There are quite a number of Family Support Unit’s initiatives that have now 
been forced to stop, including the “Operation Dusk” initiative which will allow the Unit 
to go into Nightclubs and arrest under-age participants and the naming and shaming of 
convicted sex offenders in Newspapers and Social media. On the whole, issues of rape 
and sexual violence are now coming to the fore of attention because people are now 
reporting them officially, unlike in the past when such issues were handled by “Mammy 
Queen” or Paramount Chiefs for mediation. Many in Sierra Leone are coming to reality 
with the position of the country’s Legal Access through Women Yearning for Equal 
Rights and Social Justice (LAWYERS) that rape is not about sex, but about Power. 
Despite all these, much still needs to be done in support of women-centered program 
programs like the FSU, the persistence FGM and of violence against women, the low 
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levels of girls in schools and the relative impoverishment of women. However, what 
remains a major paradox in Sierra Leone is the early and active women’s engagement in 
peacemaking process and the lack of active engagement in the postwar political 
conversations.  
 
On-Going Developments Relevant to Peace-Building and State-Building in Sierra 
Leone 
 
Since the establishment of a semblance of peace in Sierra Leone, two developments 
have emerged to test the socio-economic and political resilience of Sierra Leone. These 
developments also have connections, albeit remote, to state-building and peace-building 
conversations in the country. These are: the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease and the 
controversies surrounding rumours of a 3rd Term desire by the incumbent President 
Koroma. Interrogation of how these tie to the Peace-building and State-building 
conversations in Sierra Leone is worth discussing. 
 
The EBOLA Virus Disease 
 
In May 2014, there was an outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Liberia, and like 
a cosmic hurricane, it spread to neighbouring countries of Guinea and Sierra Leone. On 
the whole, it is believed that up the 3000 died as a result of the outbreak and since the 
end of the civil war, the outbreak of the EVD was the most profound crises that 
confronted Sierra Leone and in a way, it tested the success of some of the policies and 
strategies adopted to address the legacies of the bitter civil conflict. The EVD is 
connected to the whole discussion on Peace building and State building in three ways: 
the circumstances of outbreak; the management during the outbreak; and the post-
outbreak management.   
 
While, of course, most people in the country recognise that the actually outbreak was 
not the fault of the government and that there was very little that could have been done 
to prevent it, many people still used the opportunity to blame the government for the 
very basic medical facilities in Sierra Leone. They believe that since independence, there 




attention.72 The condition of the health situation was cited as one of the causes of the 
disaffection that resulted in the war. The inability of successive governments since the 
end of the war to take the health of the populace into consideration was seen as one of 
the failures of state-building in post-civil war Sierra Leone and the outbreak of the EVD 
was seen as the most visible manifestation. 
 
Far more profound, however, was the management after the outbreak. This has two 
main dimensions: the uncoordinated response after the outbreak and the corruption 
allegations that have plagued the disbursement of international aid. Many people in 
Sierra Leone are of the opinion that the response of the government was somewhat 
slow and that this could have resulted in the increase in casualty figures.73 Some of 
those with whom discussions were held during the field trip were also of the opinion 
that the nonchalant attitude demonstrated at the outbreak of the virus was 
characteristic of the way the country had historically been run. However, the second 
issue – the alleged mismanagement of international donor money to fight EVD – has far 
more profound impact on the linkage between peace-building and State-building. The 
Sierra Leone’s Auditor General came up with a public pronouncement that the EVD 
funds have been misappropriated and that misappropriation could have slowed down 
the national emergency response in combating the virus. In response to the scandal, the 
government immediately decided to investigate and prosecute all those involved of 
having mismanaged £12 million assigned to combat the virus. Indeed, a top government 
official interviewed for this research informed us that at a stage, foreign countries and 
international organisations preferred dealing with NGOs rather than the government.74 
 
For many Sierra Leoneans, the mismanagement of the EVD fund brought out the main 
problem facing the Sierra Leone State: the neglect of the populace by the government. 
Indeed, many people see it as yet another case of the bad culture in which people opt to 
achieve personal ambition and greed at the expense of the people. The situation was not 
helped by the controversy between the Parliament and the Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ACC) over procedural matters emanating from the Audit report. 
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The third way the EVD has become intertwined with the whole discussion on peace-
building and State-building is the belief of what the people think the government has 
learnt from the whole experience. In the course of the research, we discovered that 
many of the people interviewed that the government has not learnt anything from the 
experience and that an outbreak of another outbreak of a medical emergence would still 
be met with the same level of unpreparedness and apathy. In the course of one of the 
focus group discussion one of the participants argued that there is nothing to indicate 
that the government is different from the previous ones that have ruled the country 
since independence. To many Sierra Leoneans, there was no serious state-building in 
certain aspects of life, despite the bitter civil war that was meant to address some of the 
anomalies that have characterised the Sierra Leone state.  On the whole, what EVD 
brought out is that, for the first time since the end of the war, it put the crucial issue of 
human survival at the centre of debate in the country, and as a Presidential aspirant of 
the opposition political party put is succinctly: “What Ebola taught us is that anyone 
elected President of this country has a duty to ensure that thousands of his compatriots 
no longer die so needlessly on his watch”.75 This same trend in arguably noticeable in 
the way the whole issue of Climate Change has been addressed in the country. 
 
Moreover, the EVD crisis has been politicised. Respondents argue that during the Ebola 
outbreak the government took advantage of the ban on public gathering to limit 
political participation. According to respondents these highlights the declining freedom 
of expression with some arguing that unlike the former president Kabba who allowed 
the youth to critique the government the current government has lead a campaign of 
clampdown on several musicians who have been critical of it. This declining space for 
political participation and critical debate is reminiscent of the pre-war political 
repression especially the clampdown on student protests.  
Tenure Elongation Controversies 
 
Without doubt, a subject that is currently most contentious in Sierra Leone is the issue 
of term elongation for the current President Ernest Koroma, whose current term ends in 
                                                 





--- at the completion of the mandatory two-terms. A number of things, however, makes 
this controversy unusual, the most important being the fact that, while there has really 
never been anything official about it, it is being widely discussed in a way that would 
not have been different even if the currently President had in fact officially declared his 
intentions along that line. Indeed, it is the most important subject of political discussion 
in the country and the passionate debate being generated is of such profundity that 
many believes that it has the potentials of leading the country to another round of civil 
war, especially against the background of the historical antipathy between the two main 
political parties. A major political development in the country, the President’s sacking of 
his deputy, has further added another layer to the intrigues surrounding tenure 
elongation.76The sacking of the vice president and the lands minister without giving any 
reason to the public has also been understood by the respondents as an attempt by the 
president to limit political participation and debate. Some understood this as a 
demonstration by the president to push and pass his own agenda. 
 
In terms of its origin, it is really difficult to determine when and how the whole 
controversy of tenure elongation started. What is, however, beyond dispute is that by – 
it has become a key feature of debate in the country. As would be expected, the whole 
issue has divided the country along party lines, with the SLPP warning that there would 
be dire consequences if there is any attempts, in whatever guise to manipulate the 
constitution for the extension of the current tenure of President Koroma and the APC 
either keeping silent on the possibility or openly advocating for it. On the part of the 
President himself, while there has been no official confirmation, there is, significantly, 
no denial.77 Additionally the “more time” agenda has been used to weaken the 
opposition through intimidation and buying out of its members. 
 
The Tenure Elongation controversy is relevant to the Peace building and State-building 
discourse in Sierra Leone in a number of ways. First, it is bound to raise the 
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 Tenure elongation controversies centre around the suspected desire of the incumbent President Koroma to 
extend his terms of office beyond the mandatory two-terms 
 
77 APC supporters are busy going about with the slogan “After you, na, you”, a Creole statement which means “After 
your term, it will again be your term”, or simply, “You will succeed yourself”. The SLPP, on its part has been writing 
articles drawing the attention of Sierra Leoneans to the failed attempt by the former Nigeria President, Olusegun 






fundamental question as to whether any state-building lesson has been learnt from the 
whole experience of post-conflict Peace-Building. There are now growing concerns that 
such a step, if it was ever dared, would indicate that no lesson has been learnt from the 
bitter civil war. There are also distinct possibility that such an unconstitutional act 
could thorough the country back to civil war. Second, the whole possibility of tenure 
elongation, in whatever guise, would increase the tension between the two main 
political parties. What is most likely to make this tension more profound is the fact that 
some of those at the forefront of the call for tenure elongation, including Robin Farley, 
were former member of the SLPP.78 This latest undemocratic tactics was first mumbled 
by Leonard Balogun Koroma, Minister of Transportation, before he was compensated 
with a ministerial post by the president.  
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Conclusion: The Future from Where We Stand 
 
The general belief in Sierra Leone is that the issues that led to the civil war in the first 
place such as patrimonialism, lack of rule of law, state control of the judiciary, lack of 
transparency with the awarding of mineral concessions, corruption, manipulation of 
opposition parties, cronyism, youth unemployment, and the lack of judicial and 
legislative independence continue to be recurring issues in the post conflict state 
building conversations.79 There are indeed some who feel that there are still issues that 
some of the on-going developments, especially the issue of tenure elongation, can result 
in conflict. Although others who took part in the FGD did not share this view, they 
nevertheless caution against overstretching of the people’s desire for peace.  
 
There is also the general belief in the country that the constitution needs to be 
reviewed. The present constitution is now about 25 years old (1991) and some post-
war developments have shown the weakness in some of its clauses. A specific one is the 
electoral requirements for the President. As it is now, to avoid a Run-Off, a candidate 
must have 25% of the total national vote. Because of the way the two parties have 
divided the country, this is becoming very difficult. On one occasion when there was a 
run-off (2007), there was such tension and the country almost went back into the war 
before the ruling party eventually conceded defeat. So that part of the constitution will 
be reviewed and follow other countries where it is just 50% + 1. This and a number of 
other issues are now being addressed through the Constitutional Review Committee 
(CRC) process. The committee is expected to make its recommendations to the 
government.  
 
Also noticeable is the setting up various institutions such as the anticorruption 
commission, ombudsman, and human rights commission, and the passing of various 
laws including the three gender laws. There is a level of satisfaction within the society 
with the enactment of these laws and the setting up of these institutions that did not 
previously exist before the war. However, the biggest challenge is guarantying that 
these institutions are effectively running, are free of state or political inference and thus 
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able to address the above recurring issues that were and are at the state-building 
conversation in Sierra Leone. Despite the enactment of these laws and the building of 
institutions, the main challenge lies with the judiciary, there are challenges with the 
interpretation of law, the lack of evidence, delays in sittings that can take up to two or 
three years. 
 
The structures created after the peace-building processes are there although there are 
challenges with the working of these structures. Ironically, even though they are not 
working effectively, there is some level of confidence with them, especially as they did 
not exist before the war. There is some level of confidence that there is some form of 
mechanism for redress. Some believe that there has not been a building of capable 
political parties and the effective oversight institutions like the parliament. There are 
also concerns that a lot of money has been spent on the executive and oversight 
institutions have been left out. Also there is the argument that the government budget 
has focused on buying water-guns for the police, demonstrating that Peace-Building is 
yet to change the logic of the state. This lack of effective and inclusive institutions is 
seen by some as a threat to democracy.  
 
Economic management is also a central issue that politicians continue to undermine. 
For example, politicians and their relatives have been accused of bankrupting two of the 
major banks in Sierra Leone. Economic ratings have improved along with regional 
indexes. There are regional imbalances in development. Although the economy has 
improved, recent economic events are worrying. This include, the drop in iron ore 
prices, job cuts in the mining industry, Chinese hostile takeover over mining companies 
that have gone into administration, the Chinese are asking to reduce the workers from 
3500 to 350, loss of the Sierra Leone currency against the dollar, prices increase and the 
increases in PAYE tax by the government from 35% to 40%.. The economic growth has 
thus been revised to 18%. Additionally the economic growth has had little impact on 
ordinary Sierra Leoneans. However, people’s expectations are very high and this is good 
for peace-building. 
 
There is the concern that the freedom of expression is declining. Opposition party 




government through art, the current government has led a campaign of clampdown on 
several musicians who have been critical of it.  During the Ebola outbreak the 
government took advantage of the ban on public gathering to limit political 
participation. An opposition Member of Parliament argues that what passes is the 
president agenda. This is demonstrated for example by the sacking of the vice president 
and the lands minister without giving any reason to the public. This has resulted in the 
weakening of the opposition due to fear or political buyouts.  In particular, the “more 
time” agenda has allegedly been used to weaken the opposition through intimidation 
and buying out of its members. 
 
Most Sierra Leoneans expressed satisfaction with the holding of elections. There have 
been four peaceful elections since the end of the war. Although there has been some 
electoral related violence, these elections have been largely peaceful and have brought 
about a level of democratisation. This is attributable to civil education, voter education, 
the women situation room and the national election watch by CSO that monitors and 
observes all elections in the country. The youth felt that the coming of multiparty 
system has increased youth participation in election processes. There has however, 
been reported cases of political intimidation of the local population along the party lines 
in the country. For example during the bye election campaigns in Kono, the vice 
president who comes from the ruling party is reported to have threated to withdraw 
development assistance to the local community if they did not vote for the ruling party, 
APC. 
 
On the whole, in looking at the broad subject of peace-building and state-building in 
post-civil war Sierra Leone, it would appear that the peace agreements, though largely 
externally sponsored, recognised that there are deep-seated internal contradictions the 
hold the key to enduring peace in the country. However, the urgency to end the carnage 
forced on them the need to prioritise their intervention strategies and to focus on key 
issues that would put temporary cessation to the conflict, in the hope that subsequent 
governments after the agreements would, over time address deep seated issues once 
broad frameworks are laid. The wisdom or otherwise of this strategy is left to 
professional historians. 
 
